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Decision

Arbitrum One (chain ID 42161) is the canonical chain for all deCDN contracts. Native USDC is used — not bridged USDC.e:
0xaf88d065e77c8cC2239327C5EDb3A432268e5831  // Circle CCTP USDC
Cross-chain payment channels are excluded from v1.

Why Arbitrum One

  • DeFi depth. Highest TVL of any major L2, with strong Balancer V3 aggregator routing density. Important for buyback execution.
  • Forced-inclusion delay. ~24 h upper bound on sequencer censorship — fits cleanly under the 48 h dispute window.
  • Governance tooling. Battle-tested OpenZeppelin Governor + TimelockController deployments already in production. Nothing new to qualify.
  • Gas predictability. Gas costs are calibrated at levels where per-voucher settlement economics remain viable.

Why native USDC, not USDC.e

Bridged USDC.e carries counterparty risk with the bridge operator and can diverge from native USDC in peg crises. Circle’s CCTP native USDC is fungible 1:1 across supported chains via Circle’s attestation, with no bridge-contract risk.

Why not Base or OP Mainnet

FactorArbitrumBaseOP
Balancer V3 aggregator coverageStrongModerateWeaker
Current DeFi TVLHighestGrowingModerate
Fraud proofsLiveLive (permissioned)Live
Base and OP are both respectable options — the decision is about marginal fit, not categorical superiority.

Re-evaluation triggers

The decision is revisited if any of the following happen:
  • Gas costs on Arbitrum One spike persistently above a configured threshold (erodes per-voucher settlement economics).
  • Fraud-proof vulnerabilities are disclosed on Arbitrum (security regression).
  • Sequencer censorship events materially exceed the 24 h forced-inclusion window (dispute-window safety regression).

Cross-chain out of scope

Payment channels settle on exactly one chain. Cross-chain channels would require the payment contract to verify remote-chain state via a bridge, pulling bridge security into the payment layer. Out of scope. Source ADR: 021-l2-chain-selection.md