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Cache hit

The client picks the candidate with the best combination of price, latency, and reputation. After settling on a node, it opens a USDC channel and streams. Vouchers cover every byte delivered; the node can settle any voucher on-chain later.

Cache miss with pull-through

Paid delivery is one protocol — used both client→node and node→node. Every byte of the node-to-node pull is paid by the serving node, which amortizes that cost across many downstream client deliveries. If pull-through is disabled in the node’s config, the node returns a redirect pointing to a peer (never an origin URL). The client opens a channel with that peer directly.

Payment channels in three lines

  1. Open — client opens a channel on-chain. Deposit is escrowed in the PaymentChannel contract.
  2. Vouchers — off-chain signed messages updating the cumulative amount owed. Cadence is negotiable per stream.
  3. Close — either party submits the latest voucher on-chain. A dispute window lets the counterparty submit a later-nonce voucher if the close is stale.

What keeps the network honest

  • Hash verification. Clients verify every chunk against the known blob hash. A bad byte voids payment.
  • On-chain evidence. Protocol messages are signed in a form that can be verified on-chain as evidence of phantom announcements, rate manipulation, or blacklist violations (slashing).
  • Synchronous adjudication. The on-chain judge verifies submitted evidence and slashes on the spot, with no counter-evidence window.
  • Reputation. A 0.0–1.0 score combining direct experience and signed gossip from staked nodes (reputation).
  • Content blacklist. Governance-managed on-chain hash blacklist. Serving a blacklisted hash after the compliance window is slashable (takedown).

Where the boundary sits

LayerTrust
Bytes deliveredVerified against known hash
Node availabilityTrusted — slashed if phantom-announced
Node rate honestyTrusted — slashed if advertised rate contradicts charged rate
Origin backend correctnessAssumed — outside protocol scope (operator concern)
L2 RPC provider honestyAssumed — mitigated via multi-source bootstrap
See privacy for the adversary model.